In consultation with the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations, Great
Britain argued that it could not leave Palestine as a unitary self-governing state, but it should be able to relinquish its trusteeship if the territory were divided into two states, a Jewish State and an Arab State. The question then turned to the allocation of Palestinian land between the two new entities. Great Britain argued that the division should not reflect the actual numbers of Jews and Palestinians living in the territory because the Jews, as an ethnic/religious entity, had a right to invite the surviving victims of the Holocaust to come and live in the new Jewish State. As a result, the proposed "partition plan" would give substantially more territory to the Jewish State than was warranted by the number of Jews living in Palestine. (I might add that I have always believed that the British decision was both morally and legally justified under the circumstances.) 5. On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly adopted the key "partition" resolution, Resolution 181, ratifying the British proposals. It also provided for an independent international mixed status for the city of Palestine. In my opinion, this
Resolution constitutes the first, last, and only legally authorized demarkation of the Israeli-Palestine borders. It was legally authoritative not because it took the form of a UN Resolution, but solely because the UN Resolution itself served as a ratification of the British proposal to divide the Mandate and leave its governance to the people. In other words, the alpha and omega of the legal power resided in Great Britain as the trustee and not in the United Nations. As trustee, it had the power to partition the territory if and only if that was the best way to provide for its future self-government. The General Assembly did not derive its legal powers directly from the Charter of the UN, but rather as surrogate for the League of Nations. It was the League as a supervisory authority over the British Mandate that devolved its powers of mandate supervision to the UN and, through the UN, to the General Assembly itself. Legal title to the land was not conferred by Resolution calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces "from territories of recent conflict" and "achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem." Israel and the U.S. interpreted the Resolution's call for "withdrawal from territories," and not "the" territories, as a less than complete withdrawal because the word "the" was not mentioned. The mild joke in circulation at the time was that anyone opposed to the U.S.-Israeli interpretation was "anti-semantic". Israel took the position that it was therefore not legally required to withdraw from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that it had just conquered, and indeed that it could erect Israeli settlements in those territories. ANTHONY D'AMATO: Mr. Kopelman, the first thing to note is that only states can sign treaties. Thus the Palestinian Authority is excluded. Second, a treaty between A and B cannot change the territorial rights of C. So, my answer to your question would be "no."
As for Mr. Mobarek's question, United Nations General Assembly Resolution (UNGAR) 181 was not, in my view, a "resolution" in the normal sense of a nonbinding expression of attitude or policy by the General Assembly. Rather, in this special case, it was a surrogate for an authoritative finding by the Trusteeship Council which should have had jurisdiction over the Palestine question but was not given jurisdiction over it in the transition between the League of Nations and the United Nations. The "mandates" regime of the League had to go somewhere, and in my view it went to the UN as a whole, which means that it went to the General Assembly.
As a general matter-and in response to questions whether the Israel-Palestine conflict is similar to many others-I think we're dealing here with a unique situation. That's why it's even misleading to use words like "treaty" and "resolution" in this context, because they obscure more than they disclose. The essence of the situation is that this is a mandate, a trusteeship if you will, that cannot be wholly conceptualized within the framework of law courts. It takes a certain amount of familiarity with the rise of the Chancery court system in England and the idea of equitable jurisprudence to get a handle on what the framers of the Covenant of the League of Nations had in mind. Palestine is the last remaining mandate, and we probably will not have a chance to use this ancient learning again, but it has turned out to be a very important mandate. We scholars do not have the time or talent to go to the Middle East and get on a soapbox or help distribute food to the refugees or network at great length with distressed Israeli citizens, but we can do what we do best, which is to dig below the surface of the arguments and charges and invective that characterize debates on this subject, and see if doing the "legal thing" might in some small way possibly help.
SAMEH MOBAREK: Professor D'Amato, thank you for your elaboration. I've always believed that the UN had authority over the mandate by virtue of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and Chapters 11 and 12 of the subsequent UN Charter. Great Britain, as mandatory power, had authority over the mandate as a proxy for the League of Nations. When they abandoned the mandate, they lost any special authority, aside from their power as a voting member of the General Assembly, to approve or disapprove any changes to the mandate (partition would certainly be one) as detailed in Article 79 of the UN Charter. When the mandate was terminated, sole authority over the underlying trust territory reverted to the General Assembly (reference Article 85(1)). The Trusteeship Council's purpose was to render assistance to the General Assembly in carrying out its (the General Assembly's) duties in the trust territories (reference Article 85(2)). Consequently, the General Assembly had jurisdiction over the trust territory to pass UN GAR 181 and did so to discharge its duties in Article 76.
Perhaps what I am still a bit unclear about is the force behind UN GAR 181. This comes back to the definition of an 'authoritative finding'. As I understand it, a finding requires a high level of consensus among UN members for it to become an 'authoritative' finding and part of international law. From explanations given, am I correct in assuming that a finding, in the context of UN GAR 181, is more like an 'administrative' finding by an authority with subject matter jurisdiction and not so much an 'authoritative' finding within the context of international law? Also, if the issue were ever brought before the ICJ, what weight would the court give to such a finding? What would be the key issues that the court would have to decide on? ANTHONY D'AMATO: An authoritative finding in the context of an international Mandate or Trust is a mixed question of law and fact, or more precisely, a factual determination made under the aegis of the mandate instrument. When I worked on the South West Africa cases in the early 1960s, it was my job to draft the portions of the brief (for the plaintiff states Ethiopia and Liberia) on the devolution of the South West African mandate as if it had been supervised by the Trusteeship Council. (Like the Palestine Mandate, the South West African Mandate was never negotiated with the Trusteeship Council and so did not fall under the Trusteeship Council's actual jurisdiction.) I made a number of proposed intermediate findings of fact concerning the situation in South West Africa-the degree of participation of the inhabitants in local government, the degree and universality and relevance of education, the economic well-being of the people, opportunities for advancement, etc. All of these led up to my proposed ultimate authoritative finding: that an extension of the apartheid system into South West Africa would contravene the terms of the Mandate. The Mandate would be contravened because the well-being of the inhabitants would in all the particularities examined, be worsened rather than promoted by racial discrimination. Except for the apartheid system, South West Africa by the 1960s was prepared to stand alone. And indeed, in due course it became the independent nation of Namibia. It had come a long way from its Class C Mandate status. Palestine began as a Class A Mandate. The obstacle was not apartheid or any other overarching system; rather, it was the personal antagonism between Jews and Arabs, fueled not by the Palestinians but by the neighboring Arab states. This was an unprecedented situation for the UN. Palestine was clearly ready to become an independent state and get rid of its status as a Mandate, except for the fact that a democratic government would be divided pretty much down the middle, and waves of Jewish immigrants from Europe would upset whatever political balance might have been drawn between Arabs and Jews in a new government. In other words, but for the ArabJew division, Palestine could have been given its independence. Under this unique circumstance, it would not have made much sense for the UN to continue the Mandate. The situation wasn't going to get any better; indeed, immigration would make it more volatile. The people weren't going to get any closer to standing alone than they already were; they did not need more tutelage in self-government, for example. Thus the Mandate was all but ready to expire on its own--except for the conflict between Arabs and Jews. Thus, the reasonable solution led to an authoritative finding by the UN General Assembly (acting for the UN as a whole, including the Trusteeship Council which did not have jurisdiction over Palestine) that splitting the country into two new nations would fulfill the terms of the Mandate. Thus independence would come to Palestine not as a unitary state but as two states. As I said earlier, Great Britain for political reasons did not want to endorse this proposal, but they had a lot to do with thinking it up, and they did not vote against it. Thus Resolution 181 in November 1947 said, basically, that the two-state solution would terminate the Mandate, and that the partition should be thus-and-so (taking into account projected Jewish immigration), along specified geographical lines and markers. Now, in fact, the UN's solution has been only half fulfilled. Israel became a state in 1948 but there was no comparable Arab state (although of course, as has been mentioned in this forum, a number of Arab entrepreneurs gave it a good try in the hopes of installing themselves as the new government of the Arab state.) So what we were left with after Israel became a state in May, 1948, was a UN boundary line between the Israeli state and the forthcoming Arab state. In my opinion, nothing since then has changed as a matter of law. Nothing Jordan has done, or Israel has done, or the UN Security Council has resolved (whether in Resolution 242 or any other), has affected the international legal boundary. In particular, international boundaries do not change as a result of the use of force, for reasons previously given. What about the territory underlying the proposed Arab state? What is its status today? If you accept my argument, it follows that the "Arab" portion of Palestine is still a UN Mandate. It will cease to being a mandate if an Arab state comes into being. Obviously, the negotiations for an Arab state --now called the Palestinian State --will deal with the boundary questions. But a sovereign state always has the right to cede portions of its territory. I imagine that the US and Israel and other negotiators will ask for a final "closing" that establishes a Palestinian State at the same moment that it fixes the boundaries of that new state. The Arabs have already proposed that these boundaries can be the pre-1967 boundaries which give Israel more than double the land that was allocated under the 1947 Partition. As I said at the outset, I think that's a pretty good deal for Israel. However, Israel has to decide for itself, just as the new Palestinian state has to decide for itself, whether it's a good deal. Like a successful labor negotiation, both sides have to walk away unhappy. Anderson, I agree with your conclusion that returning to the 1947 partition plan would require Israeli consent. However, my reasons for reaching this conclusion are likely to be different than yours. I believe it was Professor D'Amato that first said that any state can consent to the annexation of its own territory to another state. In giving such consent, the annexation becomes an acceptable action under international law. In the Oslo Accord, the Palestinians accepted to limit the scope of peace negotiations to the pre-1967 border and to recognize Israel within borders established by the 1949 armistice. In this respect, they consented to Israeli annexation of territory earmarked for the 'Arab' state of UN GAR 181. It was Professor D'Amato's original contention, which I agreed with, that such position was obviously favorable to the Israelis. If the Palestinians had not consented to this annexation, it is highly unlikely that the UN would have stepped in and enforced UN GAR 181. The UN has proven itself completely ineffective when it comes to issues dealing with Israel. Therefore, I agree with your statement that Israel would have to willingly consent and withdraw to the partition line for the partition plan to become a reality. ANTHONY D'AMATO: Yi Ling, you say that as a layperson you assume that the Security Council has more power than the General Assembly. I think you've answered your own question. Although laypersons may so think, a careful reading of the UN Charter in its entirety shows that the powers of both organs are limited. Indeed, the "range" of GA jurisdiction is much broader than the SC, while the military power of the SC is stronger within the Charter's specified limits. But in either case, the mandate power resided in the League of Nations, and when the League was extinguished in 1946, the mandate power devolved to the UN which had been established in 1945. It was contemplated that the Trusteeship Council would take over the mandate supervision, and for the most part that is what happened, but it did not happen with respect to Palestine nor with respect to South West Africa. Except for the fact that these are class A and C mandates respectively, much of the same legal analysis applies to both. As I argue, it is the GA, not the SC, which inherits the mandate supervisory power, as it's power is much broader than that of the Security Council. The latter properly stepped in when there was a threat to the peace in resolution 242, but it had no power to redraw the lines of the mandate, and in fact, did not attempt nor purport to do so.
YI LING: Professor has endeavored to elucidate the trust issue from the international law point of view and I have endeavored to elucidate the trust issue from the commercial and corporate law point of view, based on our different legal exposure. Initially, being untutored in international law, I too was swayed, over whelmed, enticed, distracted by the UN SCR and the precise terms in the UN GAR 181, where the latter in the same breath of partitioning also set a date for termination of the Mandate. However when I read the clues that the Professor gives from international law point of view and relate them to my own ground experience in commercial law practice, I can appreciate the Professor's sound international law argument, that the Mandate exists until the Arab state of Palestine is created.
-end -
